In this essay, I situate Irigaray's philosophy of sexuate difference between the Heideggerian response to the collapse of the project of western modernity ("only a god can save us") and that of decolonial theorist Oscar Guardiola-Riviera ("only Indians can save our modern soul"). First, I return to Heidegger's theorization of "planetary technicity" as the ontology of modernity arguing, with Heidegger, that in order to respond to this problem we must return to the question of Being. From here, I link Heidegger's theory of technicity with the work of decolonial theory on the "coloniality of Being," suggesting that one reason for Heidegger's pessimism is that he did not think technicity from beyond a Eurocentric perspective. The recent "ontological turn" in decolonial anthropology that seeks to study indigenous thought as ontology, however, shows that there are resources for thinking beyond the onto-logic of technicity. Yet, here, I return to Irigaray's critique of Heidegger for his forgetting of sexuate difference in his analysis of technology to say that a move to a decolonial ontology beyond planetary technicity can only take place if we go through an ontology of sexual difference: because, as Irigaray shows, the onto-logic of technicity that underwrites coloniality and modernity begins in an ontological annihilation of life, sexuate difference, and the maternal debt, the only way to recover this is by thinking the question of sexuate difference. Finally, I conclude by examining the case of the Kogi peoples of Colombia who have warned westerners that the destruction of the planet can only be stopped if we learn to recompense our common Mother. This case, I suggest, shows how and why the turn to non-western ontologies as a way out of the death project of modern technicity must reckon with the work of Irigaray.
that is not entirely of our own possession and production, to the mystery of belonging to something that is out of our control, to forms of creative expression that reveal Being in new ways. For the late Heidegger, the only task left for thinking is to return to the question that western metaphysics never thought and that cannot be thought by technical-scientific rationality: the question of Being as irreducible to any being (even to God).
Given this, it certainly would have come as no surprise to Heidegger, who in 1939 had already defined the modern age as the age of the "conquest" of the world as the sum total of "man's representing productions," that our epoch would one day be designated as the Anthropocene. 4 And although climate scientists have made it clear that we no longer have the luxury of time to poetize while awaiting the coming god, the fact that techno-scientific rationality appears to be the only possible way of thinking climate change should make us pause long enough to consider that perhaps Heidegger's message was not so far off base. Indeed, how else are we to understand the nowprevalent dictum that continental philosophy must adapt itself to the sciences if it is to have any relevance in the contemporary world except in terms of Heidegger resisted the 'planetary imperialism of technically organized man'? Perhaps, as Oscar GuardiolaRivera has recently put it, 'only Indians can save our modern soul'? 6 If the crisis of technicity is caused by the forgetting of Being in western metaphysics, then the ongoing "ontological turn" in anthropology that is returning to the question of Being as it is posed in indigenous thought might offer us an alternative future to that of the global domination of technical-scientific rationalityperhaps even a future at all.
But because technicity is the (western) understanding of Being in the modern age, it is not something that we can simply will ourselves out of through engagement with or appropriation of indigenous thought. Indeed, Heidegger himself had made this point when asked in the 1966 interview about a turn to "Eastern" thought as a way out of the enframing of planetary technicity:
My conviction is that only the same place where the modern technical world took its origin can we also prepare an overturning [Umkehr] of it. In other words, this cannot happen by taking over Zen Buddhism or other Eastern experiences of the world. For this overturning of thought we need the help of the European tradition and a new appropriation of it. Thought will be transformed only through thought that has the same origin and determination.
order to make "even disagreement with an animist warrior possible." 9 One such reappropriation is the theory of creolization and the decolonial rereading of the history of modern philosophy in terms of the concept of "coloniality." To be sure, before a real engagement-that is to say, a nonappropriative relation capable of sharing in difference-with indigenous thinking is possible, it is necessary to decolonize the Eurocentric presuppositions of ontology. In this essay, however, I argue that no such decolonial project is possible without also thinking the question of sexuate difference.
In this, I follow Luce Irigaray, who has amply demonstrated that western metaphysics-the metaphysics that gives rise to coloniality and planetary technicity-originates in an oblivion of sexuate difference. This oblivion, according to Irigaray, dissociates us from living nature and thus must be attended to before we would be capable of cultivating life, approaching nature, or engaging with another intellectual heritage as anything other than a reserve of resources. Although her work remains controversial in precisely this respect, this is precisely why Irigaray has suggested-in reference to Heidegger's invocation of the saving power of a god-that it is sexuate difference that 'could bring us "salvation" [nous apporterait le «salut»]' if we thought it through. 10 Sexuate difference has such a saving power because, for Irigaray, it offers a 'different articulation of the speaking animal with nature, with matter, and with the body," all of which have been suppressed within the history of western metaphysics, and especially so in the age of modern techno-science. and is also an indigenous mode of resistance to the global death project of planetary technicity-one that they seek, at least in part, to share with us-I argue that it allows us to see how the passage from God to the Indians can only take place through sexuate difference. It is only such a passage, I
argue, that would permit us to enter into a new constellation of Being, to borrow one of Heidegger's favorite phrases, one that, perhaps, would offer us a chance for life.
Planetary Technicity and the Global Death Project
Modern technicity, for Heidegger, is identified not with any particular technological modalities or objects but rather by a general ontological comportment in which everything is positioned as inventory in a "standing reserve" that is constantly available for human appropriation and manipulation. 12 Heidegger refers to this comportment as "positionality" (das Ge-Stell) in which Being becomes nothing but a process of ordering the pieces of the standing reserve and thinking takes the form of an instrumental and calculative rationality driven by efficacy and accumulation. While the origin of technicity can be located in the tekhne of ancient Greece, which named the revealing of
Being by human know-how rather than by "nature" (physis), with the reformulation of nature as a universal and uniform realm of objectivity within the modern mathematical sciences, modern technicity turns all Being into objects for and of the human subject. 13 Within the modern epoch, then, technicity is not merely one mode of revealing among others, nor is it the "application" of scientific knowledge; it is the very meaning of Being as such, the a priori condition of all experience, and the fundamental relation to Being necessary for any particular scientific or technological development. If within the Ge-Stell of technicity, all Being is understood as always already standing by (at least as "matter" and "energy") and there is nothing more to be revealed, then humanity is compelled to develop ever-more efficient, precise, and expansive ways of ordering it (hence the insatiable drive that animates technical and scientific "progress"). This is why Heidegger describes positionality the "plundering drive that orders the constant orderability of the complete standing reserve. Planetary technicity is thus the ontology of the so-called modern globalized world. The positioning of the universe as standing reserve both makes possible the relentless pursuit of accumulation that drives global capitalism and makes necessary the management and administration of these resources on a global scale. From this perspective, seemingly opposed projects such as the ruthless plunder of the global South by multinational conglomerates and development programs that seek to "modernize" these nations, are underwritten by the same onto-logic, the same logic of Being.
Regardless of their "own" subjective motivations, humans are themselves conscripted into planetary technicity, which seeks only its own totality. Everything (including humans) becomes the ends and means of everything else as the world becomes nothing but a complex interconnection or "network" of diverse techniques and technologies. From the ever more horrific technics for manufacturing death and debility in wars and occupations to the ever more remarkable technics for manufacturing life and health, from the coal production of China to the green geoengineering of Scandinavia, the planet is nothing but an assemblage of technical possibilities and goals that are ontologically equivalent. In this onto-logic of general equivalence, meaning (i.e., qualitative difference) is produced only through the accumulation of large quantities that must, moreover, be ever-greater in order to even register as value. "Wealth, health, productivity, knowledge, authority, imagination," as Nancy writes, are "all enlisted into the same logic whose general principle seems to be the conversion of quantity into quality. Large numbers lay down the law, whether they be of money, population, speed, power, circulation, information, and so on. In any case, and in the interconnection of all these registers, 'quality,' that is, 'value' or 'meaning' is dispersed in the interactive correlation of all large Simplistically put, human rights violations, climate change, illness, wars, earthquakes, and so on happen…because of the world's disequilibrium. This imbalance affects all spheres of life, from the micro and intimate, to the macro structural and macrocosmic. It stems from a lack of reciprocity-more exactly, from some human beings' unwillingness or inability to recompense the Mother for what She has given and to attend to Her teachings. This inability to work with the Mother is part of that which continues to give force to the death project.
The merit of Heidegger's analysis of planetary technicity is that it allows us to understand the fundamental ontology of global capitalism and globalization that underlies their particular localizations.
Nevertheless, his is a Eurocentric analysis of the unfolding of technicity as the ontology of European "modernity," even if it is highly critical of this project as a "conquest" of all other ontologies. But as Walter Mignolo argues, "modernity" is a European narrative that can also be narrated from its underside: coloniality. 26 As such, planetary technicity is the ontology of coloniality as well as modernity: to study it from this vantage leads both to a richer analysis of its operations and modalities as well as to a different horizon of possibilities for overcoming it. The fact that
Heidegger did not consider technicity from the perspective of coloniality is certainly one of the reasons that he grew increasingly despairing about moving beyond it.
The concept of coloniality refers above all to the matrix of power established in the Spanish conquest of the Americas, which inaugurated a new world system. 27 According to decolonial theorists such as Quijano and Mignolo, it was on the basis of the new forms of power relations developed in the colonial conquest that the major epistemological and economic reformulations 26 "'Modernity' is a complex narrative whose point of origination was Europe; a narrative that builds Western civilization by celebrating its achievements while at the same time hiding its darker side 'coloniality.' Coloniality, in other words, is constitutive of modernity-there is no modernity without coloniality." Walter Mignolo, The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options (Duke University Press 2011) 2-3. 27 The concept of the "coloniality of power" was first theorized by Aníbal Quijano and has been developed over the course of a now-voluminous body of scholarship. See Quijano, "Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America" (trans Michael Ennis) (2000) 1(3) Nepantla: Views from the South 533-80. Eurocentric accounts of modernity typically begin with the Reformation (1517), the Peace of Westphalia (1648), and/or the French Revolution (1789), situating colonization as an incidental, even if major, component of this history. Theorists of coloniality, on the contrary, situate the beginning of modernity in a series of events that transpired in Spain in 1492 (its "annus mirabilis"): the fall of Granada that ended nearly 800 years of Islamic presence on the Iberian peninsula, the Alhambra Decree that expelled all Jews who did not convert to Catholicism, the publication of the first grammar of a modern language (Gramática de la lengua castellana by Antonio de Nebrija), and the arrival of Columbus at Guanahani that soon lead to the displacement of the Mediterranean by the Atlantic trade route (see, for example, Dussel above note 8).
constitutive of "modernity" took place: namely, Reason (which decolonial theorists call "epistemic coloniality"), the state (or "political coloniality"), and capitalism (or "economic coloniality").
Coloniality thus consists of a colonization of space, time, knowledge, exchange, social relations, and so on that subsists and persists beyond any localized colonial contexts and continues to shape the contemporary forms of settler colonization and neo-colonization (or "globalization") today. "I" becomes the modern determination of the Being of beings, that is, the metaphysical ground or sub-jectum of beings, which become ob-jects that stand against the subject. In this, the principle and origin (the arkhe) of beings is no longer, as it was in the Aristotlean cosmos, nature (or phusis) but rather the knowledge of the human (tekhne). This technical reinvention of nature as a realm of objectivity is thus, for Heidegger, the first step in the accumulation of all that is in the standing reserve, which is why he famously calls modern physics the "herald of positionality." 30 Heidegger's Eurocentric reading of modernity leads him to act as if this reinvention of nature emerges almost ex nihilo-indeed he says that the "provenance" of modern science is "still unknown." 31 Examining it from the underside of modernity, however, enables a much fuller picture.
As Quijano points out, the paradigm of a subject that is for-itself and in-itself and an external object that is for-the-subject, and the paradigm of "nature" as composed of such objects-that is to say, the paradigm of European rationality-"could only have been the product of a relation of coloniality between Europe and the rest of the world." 32 The patterns constitutive of this paradigm can be traced to the early European involvement in the Atlantic, especially the Spanish conquest of the Canary Islands (1402-1496) and the beginning of the Portuguese trade in African slaves (1441).
In response to these events, a series of papal bulls were issued between 1452 and 1493 that conferred upon Portugal and Spain the "right of conquest" of all unknown lands, legitimizing the expropriation of territory, the seizure of all goods and resources, and the enslavement all nonChristian peoples "in perpetuity." 33 Such a move marked a fundamental difference from earlier 30 Heidegger as above note 11 at 327. 31 As above. 32 Aníbal Quijano, "Coloniality and Modernity/Rationality" (trans Sonia Therborn) (2007) 21(2-3) 174. 33 The most significant of these are the "Dum diversas" (1452) and the "Romanus pontifex" (1454) issued by Pope Nicholas V, and the "Inter Caetera" (1493) issued by Pope Alexander VI, which extended the first two into the "New World" after the first voyage of Columbus.
forms of colonization and slavery: it laid down, as an axiomatic law, a basic blueprint according to which land not even yet known was projected as terra nullis and all things (including human beings)
not even yet encountered were represented as uniform objects that could be encountered in the same way no matter the specific context. Thus, when the explorers reached "new" lands in Africa and the Americas, they no longer encountered specific places constituted by things of essentially different natures, but rather a ubiquitous "State of Nature" as essentially empty space within which objects without any essential differences could be ordered by the subject in a nearly infinite number of possible arrangements. This establishment of coloniality is thus an axiomatic primitive accumulation that ensures that "nature belongs in advance to the standing reserve of the orderable within positionality." 34 In this sense, it is coloniality that is the supposedly unknown provenance of modern science, that which first secured "nature" for techno-scientific ordering in the Ge-Stell. 35 The fact that, in this new understanding of the world, conquest is a taking possession of what already properly "belongs" to the conqueror, is a direct predecessor to the formation of the modern mathematical sciences (and philosophy) in which thinking is an apprehension or representation of what already belongs to the subject. The two faces of the European "Age of Discovery"-geographic exploration and scientific revolution-essentially belong together as a taking-possession or 34 Heidegger above note 13 at 39. 35 This point is attested to by direct historical connections: the Portuguese and Spanish expeditions (especially Columbus's 1492 arrival in the Americas) empirically disproved the reigning ChristianPtolemaic geography, which posited that the habitable land of Earth was miraculously floating at the center of the sphere of water. The publication of the first map of this "New World," Martin Waldseemüller's Universalis Cosmographia (1507), led Copernicus to realize that if the ChristianPtolemaic geography is incorrect, then the cosmology of concentric spheres orbiting around the Earth, must also be incorrect. It was Copernicus's revolutionary break with the principle of nonhomogeneity of substance between the terrestrial and celestial realms that enabled the reconceptualization of nature as composed of a homogenous physical substance in Galileo and Newton. The conquistadors, then, pioneered the first form of modern subjectivity: an individual, self-making agent placed before an external world of calculable objects and whose powers of representation and ordering alone determine all that is. And it is this repositioning of Man's place in the world that will lead to the modern reconceptualization of thinking and of freedom as a going-forth from out of the self, a laying hold or grasping. 37 In other words, the technical-colonial subject-what Dussel calls the ego conquiro (inseparably combined with the Renaissance humanists' reinterpretation of Man as homo faber)-enables and subtends the other forms of modern subjectivity: rational, political, economic.
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To place Heidegger's analysis of technicity as the ontology of modernity within the more expansive historicization of modernity offered by theorists of coloniality is to recognize technicity and coloniality as essential to one another. In this sense, planetary technicity can be understood both as the coloniality of Being (i.e., the ways in which Being is structured by the colonial matrix of power) 36 Heidegger above note 13 at 24. 37 See Heidegger above note 4 at 81-4. 38 Dussel above note 8. The founding figures of the studia humanitatis articulated the first "secular" model of the human-"Man"-through their "rediscovery" of pre-Christian Greco-Roman philosophy that allowed them to break entirely with the reigning theology of Medieval Scholasticism, which placed the human at a fixed position in the Great Chain of Being such that the only worthy knowledge was study of the ecclesiastical texts. In this reinterpretation of the human, Man is the maker of himself, thus individual discovery and knowledge are of the utmost importance. In this, there was a reciprocal influence between the humanists and the early explorers (such as Columbus and Prince Henry "the Navigator"). Consider, for instance, how Pico della Mirandola reinterprets the "fall" of Adam in his Oration on the Dignity of Man (1486), which has been called the "manifesto" of the Renaissance: "Adam we give you no fixed place to live, no form that is peculiar to you… According to your desires and judgments, you will have and possess whatever place to live, whatever form, and whatever functions you yourself choose….You with no limit or no bound may choose for yourself the limits and bounds of your nature…you may fashion yourself into whatever form you choose." It was Pope Nicholas V, the author of the papal bulls bestowing the "right of conquest," who encouraged the development of the humanities, which earlier popes had seen as heresy.
and as the Being of coloniality (i.e., as the determination of Being that underwrites coloniality 54. Viveiros de Castro is aware that making an "ontological" approach foundational risks making the European thinking of Being axiomatic, but argues that it is at the very least "tactically" necessary: "The image of Being is obviously dangerous analogic ground when it comes to anthropological re-imaginings of non-western conceptual imaginations, and the notion of ontology is not without its own risks….Nevertheless, I think the language of ontology is important for one specific and, let's say, tactical reason. It acts as a counter-measure to a derealizing trick frequently played against the native's thinking, which turns this thought into a kind of sustained phantasy, by reducing it to the dimensions of a form of knowledge or representation, that is, to an 'epistemology' or a 'worldview.' As if whatever there is to know or view was already decided beforehand-and decided, of course, in favour of our ontology. So the notion of ontology isn't evoked here to suggest that all thought, be it Greek, Melanesian, African, or Amazonian, expresses a metaphysics of Being, but to underline the fact that all thought is inseparable from the reality which corresponds to its exterior" 42 Viveiros de Castro as above at 75. Tekhne is now the arkhe of the whole: the framing of the world is tekhne and it forgets the origin that is nature. Physis is always already subjected to technology and science: that is, to the technology and science of the logos. In these, something of the manner in which physical beings grow is lost. Things, cut from their natural enrootedness, float about, wandering the propositional landscape. The phuein of physical beings is forgetten in the physis of the logos. The physical constitution of beings is forgotten in the metaphysics of Being. Nature is recreated by the logos.
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The In her reading of the history of metaphysics, Irigaray directly connects this forgetting of the vital materiality of phusis to a forgetting of sexuate difference. This occurs first through the forgetting of birth and the role of the maternal-feminine. In the pre-philosophical cosmogonies, the general process(es) of emergence and transformation (phusis and genesis) are thought explicitly in terms of birth, as evinced by the respective roots of these words (phuein and gignomai), which mean "to beget"
and "to be born." With Heraclitus and Parmenides, however, phusis-as-Being is understood precisely as "that which has no birth" (ageneton, Parmenides) or "that which always ways" (aei esti, Heraclitus). mother-nature-matter is that which gives herself endlessly without return, but her ceaseless giving is replaced by the gift that has always already been given without a giver. 46 Western metaphysics is therefore founded on a constitutive matri-cide: an elimination of the mother and of matter. To recover the vital materiality of physis means also to recover the "debt of life" to she who gave and
gives it: mother-nature-matter.
This matricide at the origin of metaphysics leads to the metaphysical oblivion of the sexuate other. In pre-philosophical Greece, as in many other cultures, the cosmos was fundamentally divided in terms of sexuate difference. For instance, ancient Greek nouns, according to Cornelia Tsakiridou, are gendered not merely in a grammatical or logical sense (as in Latinate languages) but rather ontologically. In other words, it is not that certain nouns are associated with certain gendered norms but rather that they arise from and express a particular sexuate relationship to the world. Gender functions in ancient Greek, Tsakiridou writes, "as a sensual catalog of the human lifeworld." 47 Thus, feminine words-e.g., physis, genesis, poiesis, arkhe-express patterns and relationships that have "natural equivalents or analogs" with feminine morphology, sexuality, and life processes, such as internalization, fluidity, embodiment, birth, materiality (and the reciprocal for masculine words). 48 This means that the way that phenomena were designated in language-not just in the name, but in 46 As Irigaray uses air as a synecdoche for the forgotten elemental materiality, she uses it also to recover the forgotten mother-nature-matter: "She gives [Elle donne]-first-air, and does so irrecoverably, with the exception of the unfolding, from and within her, of whoever takes air from her. While this air is-first-fluid matter carried by the blood she gives, it can also be understood as voice and phenomenon. These issue from it and are the possibility-ever material-of namingdemonstrating, of appearing in presence. She gives first. She gives the possibility of that beginning from which the whole of man will be constituted. This gift received with no possibility of a return. He cannot pay her back in kind" (Above at 28). The use of the singular pronoun "elle" throughout Irigaray's later works is meant to signify a sort of consubstantiality of the referents: mother, nature, matter, woman. Similar to Trinitarian theology, these are distinct yet are of the same "substance" (or lack thereof) as configured within metaphysics. 47 Being. For example, the feminine word for "language," glossa, emphasizes an embodied dimension of speech (i.e., the tongue), while the masculine word logos is more abstract, placing the emphasis on the utterance itself. In pre-literate Greek, then, the feminine and the masculine are two orientations toward the world, arising from particular relational and morphological contexts, with each serving as the limit and horizon of the other, and the interaction between the two producing the total reality of the Greek cosmos. As such, dialogue is a relation of desire for a perspective on the whole. 49 According to he feminine is not only a grammatical structure. It is also a certain intuition of world and a way of directing myself in it…In that context, it makes sense to say that the masculine becomes a limit, an encompassing intuition of otherness in things-similar to what the phenomenologists like to call a horizon. Within that horizon and its dynamics, a multiplicity of relations is possible which invokes but also challenges that limit. The same applies to the other side: the function of the feminine as a horizon for the masculine. The interaction of these two horizons produces the space delineated by the total reality of the Greek language-I can put this in a somewhat poetic way by calling that reality the Greek cosmos…[Greek] can speak from the body's other and from the difference of its desire toward the whole world" (Tsakiridou as above at 238 and 248).
this neutered cosmos, i.e., "Being itself," that will become the cosmos of metaphysics. 50 Once the feminine has been removed as a limit, the masculine perspective becomes the whole cosmos (i.e., "Being itself"); and yet, in order to present itself as neuter, the feminine must be actively annihilated. In this, the horizon of Being, or what lies beyond the limits of the world of the philosopher-physicist, becomes Non-Being or Nothing, rather than Being-as-Other. 51 Within this neutered cosmos, natural differences are supplanted by logical dualisms that only simulate difference within a logos that can speak only of and to the Same. Without a birth and without her, without difference, this Being can only be a Being oriented toward Nothing: a "Being-toward-death." Framed by death and by the Nothing, how could this neutered Being unfold as anything other than the nihilism of planetary technicity?
As the nihilation of Being in western metaphysics nevertheless remains a determination of Being, the desexuation of the cosmos nevertheless remains a sexuate cosmos for if there is any point that Irigaray has made clear in her oeuvre, it is that so-called neutrality is nothing but an alibi for the reign of the masculine. Thus, while the written text and philosophical thought enabled the neutralization of cosmology, the experience of the world codified there was not neutral, but specifically masculine. Indeed, as Tsakiridou notes, it is not that a new, neutral vocabulary was invented to express this new, neuter cosmology; rather what was new was that this cosmology was expressed in an entirely masculine vocabulary, with the feminine no longer being necessary to 50 As Irigaray puts it: "In order to definitively close the logos upon itself, in order for the logos to speak with itself, the traces of a relation with her are said in the neuter. For example, On in the singular is used to designate the totality of beings-there is On-and the beings are named onta-there are onta. Instead of saying: the world is born from her, and from my relation with her, the Western philosopher says: there is [it gives, Es gibt] Being, there are beings, which is, or are, without anyone who gives. There is, there are, without being born in a way, without any origin. There is, there are, mysteriously there. With the neutralization of his own being and of the whole of the universe, the Presocratic philosopher somehow prepares our tradition for nihilism." Irigaray, In the Beginning, She Was (Continuum 2013) 4. 51 As Heidegger writes of Parmenides: "Inasmuch as Being has to be distinguished from an Other and reinforced as physis, Being is distinguished from not-Being" (above note 42 at 115).
express the whole. In philosophical texts, words that had once expressed a sexuate experience of the world became "asexual and asomatic beings" and this de-materialization and de-sexuation of language and experience enabled the masculine world to present itself as neutral truth or reality, while the feminine world was silenced. 52 Logos, for instance, was no longer a distinctly masculine experience of language that coexisted with glossa, but rather became language itself. And because, as
Irigaray argues, the logos is the architectonics of metaphysics, metaphysics is isomorphic with the masculine world. Western metaphysics, that is to say, is techno-phal-logo-centric: it is the technical reconstruction of the world in the image or form of Man through the logos. 53 For Irigaray, Man is therefore "essentially technocratic," for with the banishment of birth (genesis) and living material nature (phusis) from his cosmos, tekhne would be the only mode of Being available to him. 54 As the necessary condition of all Being and thinking, without any place of her own within this metaphysics, she (mother-nature-matter-woman) is always already positioned-having been plundered-as the standing reserve out of which Man builds his dwelling. Through her famous psychoanalysis of the unconscious of western philosophy, Irigaray therefore reveals that in the same way that the barring of the relation to the mother forms the unconscious ground upon which phallic subjectivity is erected, the burial of "mother-matter" forms the "mute soil" of meta-physics. 55 By displacing (1) 52 Tsakiridou above note 46 at 248. 53 "Language [le langage] would be the technology-the architechnology, the architectonics-for man's fashioning the living according to his sexual project" (Irigaray above note 43 at 91). Thus, as Claire Colebrook points out, it is not that Irigaray merely associates the history of metaphysics with "masculine values," but that metaphysics signifies a sexuately "specific relation to Being," that of phallogocentrism. Claire Colebrook, "Feminist Philosophy and the Philosophy of Feminism: Irigaray and the History of Western Metaphysics" (1997) 12(1) Hypatia at 86. 54 Irigaray as above at 90. 55 In Speculum, Irigaray reads the history of philosophy in specifically psychoanalytic terms, to which I refer with my choice of language here. In Lacan's theorization of the phallic symbolic, the originary "fusion" (or so it is understood in psychoanalysis) with the mother must necessarily be severed and barred by the phallic signifier in order for the subject to constitute himself as such within the symbolic order. This barred relation to the mother cannot be given symbolic representation except through metaphoric substitutions and metonymic displacements. The maternal-feminine is therefore birth, (2) vital materiality, and (3) sexuate other(s) from his cosmos, the Being of Man has always been a death project, a violent conquest of her that is oriented only toward Nothing. As Irigaray writes:
This would be the "as such" [soi-même] of western man: the effect of a mastery, of a violent domination over the natural universe and not of a respect for, a contemplation of, a praise for, or an alliance with it. The history constructed by man resembles a history of enduring violence, of appropriation, of domination…Man has created, invented, and given to nature not so much because he was more than her, but because he wished to tame her. It this not, perhaps, because he was less than her?…The Being of man is constituted thanks to the limit of death: he has nothing which can overcome it. The fact remains that man places himself here on earth in a circle woven of violence and terror, thus closing every opening. In order to go beyond a conception of the world that a technical way of thinking and behaving governs, we must discover another frame or structure thanks to which human beings may escape such domination while acknowledging and interpreting the nature of its power. We must free ourselves from the technical and scientific ascendance over our epoch and ensure the safeguarding of meaning by a new incarnation of being. In reality, the meaning that we must consider and cultivate in our epoch is first that of life itself. -an understanding which, as discussed above, is itself constructed on the obliteration of pre-philosophical Greece's sexuate cosmology. Thus, when Irigaray claims that "all traditions that remain faithful to the cosmic take account of natural powers in sexuate terms," or when she suggests that an attunement to sexuate difference is necessary in order to be able to affirm any other differences, she is not seeking to make
Eurocentric sex/gender formations-which she herself challenges since the beginning of her work as a "regime of sexual indifference"-a transhistorical universal and the basis and priority of any global feminism. 65 Instead, her point is for those of us within the onto-logic of technophallogentrism: because our metaphysics is grounded in an annihilation of life and sexuate difference, we must work this out before we can have any non-appropriative encounter with nature or with the other, any relation-in-difference that is capable of respecting life itself without imposing our own (physical or logical) forms on it. This is why, in her post-Chernobyl address in which she argues that the global death project of planetary technicity is a sexuate project, she insists that a new ontology, ethics, and politics of sexuate difference is "a chance for life."
Alúna contains everything which is past and everything that may become. Alúna is intelligence; it is the concentrated thought and memory which forms a bridge between the human 'spirit' and the universe, but it also the hidden world of forces which govern the world's fertility. Alúna makes possible growth, birth, and sexuality; it is the 'spiritual' energy that makes things happen. If it did not, the world would be sterile. It would never have begun. Alúna was and is the Mother.
67
By dividing herself between memory and possibility, the Mother ceaselessly gives birth to material reality, which exists only in the present, teetering on the threshold of the immaterial past and future in a constant process of creative (re)generation. 68 Unlike in western cosmology, ancient and modern alike, the origin was not an unruly and undifferentiated chaos that would need to be ordered by a God, a demiurge, a logos, or a rational subject who would cut us off from mother-nature. The
Mother always was and, as in pregnancy, even before giving birth there is morphological differentiation within her. Based on this, the Kogi view the entire cosmos as living; indeed, they refer to the cosmos as the "fabric of life" (alúna zakwa) which is woven by the Mother on a cosmic loom using the thread of alúna. Alúna is thus the incorporeal tissue out of which the material flesh is made.
This cosmic fabric, moreover, is sexuate: the warp threads are feminine (Seynekun), giving the fabric its structure, form, and strength, while the weft threads are masculine (Seranwka) which give the fabric its pattern, appearance, and texture. In this fabric, every "point" in the cosmos, every pick in the weave, is a meeting between masculine and feminine and thus every being has a "mother" and a . Ereira notes that although the Kogi have never been converted to Catholicism (it is in no way a "syncretic religion"), Colombian Spanish itself carries its own Catholic "baggage" and that Gil's use of certain words like "spiritual" should be understood with this in mind. 68 As they describe it, in order to give birth to the physical present, the mother split the past ("memory") and the future ("possibility"), which are not physical and are not split in the nonphysical realm (Sé). The physical present is thus situated in a sort of vaginal opening between the past and the future which remain in continuous contact like lips.
"father." 69 For the Kogi, this macrocosmic ordering principle also structures microcosm, for every element of social life including language is "constructed out of the partnership of masculine and feminine, the dynamic process of weaving on the loom of life." 70 Again, however, the Kogis' cosmology is not only mythological, and is not at all some form of "irrational superstition." For them, on the contrary, material reality is underpinned by a complex yet ordered immaterial axiomatic infrastructure, Sé, which includes everything that exists (but much more than materially exists) and is bound to material reality by the thread of alúna. Sé is not a transcendent "realm," but the incorporeal sense and structure of Being. Because alúna is both concentrated thought and life-force, and because material life and consciousness are therefore a sort of dilated alúna, humans can access Sé through concentrated thought. 71 This, as one might guess, is no small feat and, indeed, can generally only be done by the Mamas, who are the Kogi's scientists, philosophers, physicians, lawyers, and spiritual leaders-i.e., the keepers of the "Law of Sé." Because 69 Indeed, even their technical artefacts are sexuate: "The idea of the balance between the masculine and the feminine runs through the whole of Kogi life, not just their sexual mores. Thus you cannot build a bridge, a hut, a loom, or construct a path that winds through a village without the masculine/feminine principle being explicitly represented in some way" (See "Women in Kogi Society," http://tairona.myzen.co.uk/index.php/culture/women_in_kogi_society). As with Irigaray, they see the technology of the western world as part of the death project because it is constructed without involving the generative principle of sexual difference and is therefore detached from life and meaningless: "The Kogi perceive life in many things which are in our understanding inanimate; any object which has meaning and purpose in the world…must be sustained by a balance of sexual forces, by its own Mother and Father" (Ereira above note 66 at 84). 70 Ereira above note 66 at 92. Because of the fundamentality of sexual difference to their culture, Ereira asked Gil about homosexuality to which he responded that although it is uncommon (and that he had never tried it), it is not considered unnatural and that there are even cases of homosexual marriage, including a story of two women who lived together as wives who were very insistent that sex between women is "far superior" (see Ereira above note 66 at 131-3). 71 As Gil describes it, "The original laws, the fundamental principles, are in Sé….Sé is not a person, not a thing. It is the sum of things. Sé is complex…There are many different forms of existence; one is the material world that arose from Sé but there is much more that exists only in spirit….
[Sé] has no corporeal being-no body, no organs." The four axioms or principles of Sé (also referred to by Gil as "parents") are: the concept of order, the concept of materiality, the concept of time (memory, present, and possibility), and the concept of sexual difference. Ereira notes that the word "spirit" is misleading and that Sé could also be called "cosmic intelligence" (Gil as above note 66 at 21-4).
the material world is an interconnected whole of nearly infinite complexity, but is embedded in a rational structure, the Kogi see it as absolutely mandatory-not to mention completely logical-that any thinking, and certainly any physical intervention, involve the incorporeal intelligence of the cosmos as a "partner" 72 In their view, then, while the science of the Younger Brother proclaims itself as the pinnacle of rational thinking, it is deeply limited and illogical because in attaining the stance of exteriority by which it surveys the world (especially through technological apparatuses), it has actually severed its direct thread to the sense of the cosmos and can therefore only infer this structure through the observation and calculation of visible effects within isolated regions of the physical world. 72 Gil as above note 66 at 23. 73 Ereira writes that his occasional attempts to explain events in the news, such as debates about nuclear weapons, during his stays with the Kogi "were regarded as baffling and irrelevant. What difference does it make if we do not destroy the world in one way, when we are about to destroy it in another?" (178). Given the incredibly brief history of western technological science in comparison to their knowledge, they see our extreme pride in our science as short-sighted: "We are, to them, like people who have jumped off of a mountain and, falling fast, are proclaiming our ability to fly" (64) . When speaking to the professional scientists in the film, the Mamas often seem extremely frustrated by the slow pace of our realizations, looking baffled when the scientists tell them about tentative research into and new "discoveries" of things they already know (esp. climate change and systems ecology). They think that our scientific burden of proof combined with our unwillingness to take any other knowledge practices seriously is endangering the entire planet.
who has most ceaselessly tied the death project of Man to the originary and ongoing matricide that constitutes the metaphysics of technicity. And it is because of her raising of the profound questions about what kind of work with respect to sexuate difference we would have to do to end this matricide, let alone to actually recompense and assist the Mother, that in this essay I have placed
Irigaray between god and the Indians.
